



Code Security Assessment

Kyberdyne

Feb 18th, 2022



Table of Contents

Summary

Overview

[Project Summary](#)

[Audit Summary](#)

[Vulnerability Summary](#)

[Audit Scope](#)

Findings

[GLOBAL-01 : Require permission control in `mintSudo\(\)` and `burnSudo\(\)`](#)

[GLOBAL-02 : Centralization risk in proxy](#)

[CON-01 : Third party dependencies](#)

[CON-02 : Missing emit events](#)

[CON-03 : Centralization related risks](#)

[HRM-01 : Lack of token existence check](#)

[TOK-01 : Logicaccl issue of `mintSudo\(\)` and `burnSudo\(\)`](#)

Appendix

Disclaimer

About

Summary

This report has been prepared for Kyberdyne to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the Kyberdyne project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

Overview

Project Summary

| | |
|--------------|---|
| Project Name | Kyberdyne |
| Platform | Other |
| Language | Solidity |
| Codebase | https://github.com/kyberdyne-game/game-contracts/tree/audit/contracts |
| Commit | 87fff7ac23e6cbe2243d1f861755161ff6f8025d |

Audit Summary

| | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| Delivery Date | Feb 18, 2022 |
| Audit Methodology | Static Analysis, Manual Review |

Vulnerability Summary

| Vulnerability Level | Total | Pending | Declined | Acknowledged | Partially Resolved | Mitigated | Resolved |
|---------------------|-------|---------|----------|--------------|--------------------|-----------|----------|
| ● Critical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ● Major | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ● Medium | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ● Minor | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| ● Informational | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ● Discussion | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Audit Scope

| ID | File | SHA256 Checksum |
|-----|---|--|
| HER | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMEvent.sol | 9d4d525c339cab239d3d8118d7fb8327c8b9b86b87a9be1b692c020a97fa7f3 |
| HEC | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMInterface.sol | 6923626821992892bd0b51125573ce2881eea285d54d18f3a55f70096e827c74 |
| HEI | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMLayout.sol | b54e7045a2cc9e2610f17ee658b1a683fb11fcfb08dad6605ac7b8b2ed2df687 |
| HEM | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMLogic.sol | 646dec8b2ab6257975127959be7f0077d5d27e033f0fc758a57a328951c15f13 |
| HEL | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMLogicBase.sol | 3aab9fb2ebcf9d0f1be2b4ffea5a15df571ac46dcd200b5544a9b0be4e71ce1 |
| HES | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMStorage.sol | 5e6e3aa86f032ce52094d2a19815efc01190147f27fda9dc6022a63f7d382f23 |
| HET | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMType.sol | 116cd66ed83c6b0e8de868dd57232b832a37acb792aedf5f49a99062099ccc12 |
| HEE | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMEvent.sol | 23064abdb1b24b55954bdc5885ce0a219580a250da15a2efe41fa7ea10e0970c |
| HRC | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMInterface.sol | 0cef499fbfa29b3f4156385cc9b492af3075d7c9e385cb16a6fed982409b5aed |
| HRI | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMLayout.sol | f5168dff811254f765deae4012270b7186b45fd6d99d1d81d8a5cadbe35e4355 |
| HRM | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMLogic.sol | 87791dd7b25043debbd98612effd707371a52458ea3ba327bf77e43e4d1c73b2 |
| HEB | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMLogicBase.sol | d47c4339ac4252b3a6ecde12d365aa0f1ef3908406ec025d929337abb42eda36 |
| HRS | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMStorage.sol | 3bfa1fe5df8b920f8f8c4a6475256abc6940de95895bd49f7736b3b91fa905ec |
| HRT | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMType.sol | 63d8576232637ac6b78750f4fb4d2b10327a0b880a03bff1a6f6a9a4e9ada2a2 |


| ID | File | SHA256 Checksum |
|-----|--|--|
| KBD | kbdNameService/KBDNameServiceEvent.sol | 73efa71bb40c6264af50fb3f4e4660e22379940ce287057e5ee5fea88b8f9b9f |
| KBN | kbdNameService/KBDNameServiceInterface.sol | e11059bae0c80f880629dbbec5a9b895ab2e99a3c300e3972348f53d9b941a1b |
| KBS | kbdNameService/KBDNameServiceLayout.sol | 05db6bb2a6976409de2c62938ea7b7531b951fbde85395b38974351fe9df0c7f |
| KBL | kbdNameService/KBDNameServiceLogic.sol | a75c8c3bdf51321140217e9bbb67c7243a34983ec5f5ea2068d6359b8f898893 |
| KBB | kbdNameService/KBDNameServiceLogicBase.sol | f33444d0fea8f35ec321fc7bcb49e0eb4eb3b00ab5aa811e5468299ff349cc51 |
| KDN | kbdNameService/KBDNameServiceStorage.sol | 840cd6f8794db50a14cea3fcd6f00db93bf25825e4e46b1919dd06558b5fbffe |
| KBT | kbdNameService/KBDNameServiceType.sol | e53c69d0dd943e765fb9ca3ee55ec9d12e646504fbc875819050162dc5594553 |
| KBR | kbdNameServiceRef/KBDNameServiceRefEvent.sol | dbe2c18d83f311d6db712e64187b1aff52321efa18e19a327accfeba0061f914 |
| KBI | kbdNameServiceRef/KBDNameServiceRefInterface.sol | 2d4b491207bb0f03b05788f68d81bc6bd34f2b40d3b6b48158deb3a129cee2d0 |
| KDS | kbdNameServiceRef/KBDNameServiceRefLayout.sol | ddaa0ef5967428f5c469eaae96f3a9385670dedd1f7c11ffd839a779cac8ca62 |
| KDR | kbdNameServiceRef/KBDNameServiceRefLogic.sol | 6a0665ce05de331e7b4c277b9095752f63aa55b7db4e784998af120af07ff782 |
| KDL | kbdNameServiceRef/KBDNameServiceRefLogicBase.sol | af2e72a3af40dff3072afd30ff6c7d6364cf14cd6139f06181e15873649fab37 |
| KNS | kbdNameServiceRef/KBDNameServiceRefStorage.sol | f834f4967c386be7babb1284a04205ec7ee55b047d8fd8c6ca92efc578e04b1a |
| KDT | kbdNameServiceRef/KBDNameServiceRefType.sol | d2fb327f095f75582f6bb36f49152e9c3fae3db195d3c6c238c0869a4562ed7f |
| KBE | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerEvent.sol | 6f2e008432f401f034236a3560cf44467681cae2f4cae127d3a0e74234d8dd98 |

| ID | File | SHA256 Checksum |
|-----|--|--|
| KDM | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerInterface.sol | 5f9ae0bc7006bd8a88b1fd2adae164ee8ad81702f4f86129cf3ac42d539403c5 |
| KDI | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerInterface1.sol | 89b39d76f5718b7b25b0f3c8dacbfa6418d309274e652792853f95408960d3b3 |
| KMI | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerInterface2.sol | 2c9524356c8094f27b20d1b81826d00d3ec9b7c3169fe0c1d7ed34421eaebf07 |
| KBC | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerInterfaceCommon.sol | 8b61c4957fd0c0b986825fe29a3377fbd856df4558aedd1f61278d3222c6dcc1 |
| KML | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerLayout.sol | 34b42de8520bb42cc9deb36c8b79b5b377cf9512d217c8d0ede426db2581e505 |
| KMM | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerLogic1.sol | 9ef3ed49195ffeda10964d21a17ab62c7955d665f448fbf666abf55b6ad7c4c8 |
| KLM | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerLogic2.sol | 07ec0032bb56c2042d0088fab91b1c97e7213e5c329bfc19ed7c3f4084c15f0b |
| KDB | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerLogicBase.sol | e9d1277400f6fe112bfe15220ca914a9a7f7c54c697770cf9b6c66740ebefea7 |
| KDC | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerLogicCommon.sol | 0e6d5419271df0cf86f75a7397ef3216dcfb496fd042ff01d5777c0564d0e78e |
| KMS | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerStorage.sol | dc6b332c3bbdc1c31f1dd7db6e7890aeefecf0a6d0b8fd820730e4731c7be4e8 |
| KMT | manager/kbdManager/KBDManagerType.sol | 0db4534a1b0c2a1b43844cf8a5a75b2cf97fcca3331855ce5f6e58cd743d251c |
| KCR | nfts/kcard/KCARDEvent.sol | 384588e04d0bd0f5863cf81f26a09b3b0e4de4f9eb1db975b15e6071ef977bb9 |
| KCD | nfts/kcard/KCARDInterface.sol | 98ff028eb2edcbd5012d75549c16e4269190c0d731c13a4ef4cf56184da4f9a6 |
| KCL | nfts/kcard/KCARDLayout.sol | eab99c60bfb35e3ccd0e2306a8a3c703fcc6afc9598c87508c3829895c28a9c4 |
| KAR | nfts/kcard/KCARDLogic.sol | 8eebed5b9d2b32bb5df307a40d041e8356eddf57e2ab9f3cd31efd572e121b9 |

| ID | File | SHA256 Checksum |
|-----|---------------------------------|--|
| KCB | nfts/kcard/KCARDLogicBase.sol | 4c8b0c290b0bd14d9299fb99ff1758a0239b23e87c0a5ece91a9298cf860da11 |
| KCS | nfts/kcard/KCARDStorage.sol | 9859eec07b3a7413058f3a2e188a47b8f873aa6d353869c31a5c7dbe99fa8e36 |
| KCT | nfts/kcard/KCARDType.sol | 99d102a78bb240617954e0b858b84ecb8d3df2de20c1a6947f3e9f363d0134f7 |
| KDE | tokens/kbd/KBDEvent.sol | a0e8547a38a1c5ea6504c4cbe1b6fab4390b55fca59911e4ff69549734e8d5e7 |
| BDI | tokens/kbd/KBDInterface.sol | 0c1bfd433107ac8957ad61e10c7499abf92e953e81002e54cf1506751ce50a56 |
| BDL | tokens/kbd/KBDLayout.sol | 30601ff41c5ca0afceac9d9bc7c623c60480a1a5e15456ef57644cc7b25c21ea |
| KBG | tokens/kbd/KBDLogic.sol | 82cfa845804aa37ca674fc151999e822fc7664085737cbeebb314066212e8b26 |
| KLB | tokens/kbd/KBDLogicBase.sol | 0a1842ef7ac9008644f5dbd87647c321fdc1a7b92eb8eeac35699d43cc3d8ae0 |
| BDS | tokens/kbd/KBDStorage.sol | f20753f3a898b46e25dcdfd269eda4845d9fecb4f477bbee1ff3f7ce1eeddbde |
| BDT | tokens/kbd/KBDType.sol | bf849c61380a3a23700894d09e76a6bab62ecc057a9eab959a4ff8ad07de0ee |
| KGL | tokens/kgold/KGOLDEvent.sol | c9c1047e93296b32c59f8ad49a67767ecb68f2cd2f6c19920c2cd5677a1299f4 |
| KGD | tokens/kgold/KGOLDInterface.sol | a4b450143ec2f85c4bf1f835ec83469f8824ae2ec1d20ed1af4006222bd13714 |
| KOL | tokens/kgold/KGOLDLayout.sol | 1514315e1bcba0710d7b94e73e95b272870e6b4dd954368c91e70196127a02ca |
| KOD | tokens/kgold/KGOLDLogic.sol | 6955a1a8e1388e7bd409cacbb9333d60ddf72cac78addb6899171f9b3f07bd53 |
| KGB | tokens/kgold/KGOLDLogicBase.sol | b30141f00aa1d66a196ad2a2605ddfcc907aa672c00c2c548a8495607eb6b824 |

| ID | File | SHA256 Checksum |
|-----|-------------------------------|--|
| KGS | tokens/kgold/KGOLDStorage.sol | ef79be76b7259c69d512e863149019e46122a8af7365a1620 25f31e93790414d |
| KGT | tokens/kgold/KGOLDType.sol | 6425d39103a07ab2c9f7011c4441c3977041be953f2a91644 2615c12e0a688d1 |

Findings



| | |
|---|------------|
| ■ Critical | 0 (0.00%) |
| ■ Major | 3 (42.86%) |
| ■ Medium | 1 (14.29%) |
| ■ Minor | 2 (28.57%) |
| ■ Informational | 1 (14.29%) |
| ■ Discussion | 0 (0.00%) |

| ID | Title | Category | Severity | Status |
|-----------|---|--|-----------------|----------------|
| GLOBAL-01 | Require permission control in <code>mintSudo()</code> and <code>burnSudo()</code> | Control Flow | ● Minor | ✓ Resolved |
| GLOBAL-02 | Centralization risk in proxy | Centralization / Privilege, Logical Issue | ● Major | ⓘ Acknowledged |
| CON-01 | Third party dependencies | Volatile Code | ● Medium | ⓘ Acknowledged |
| CON-02 | Missing emit events | Coding Style | ● Minor | ✓ Resolved |
| CON-03 | Centralization related risks | Centralization / Privilege | ● Major | ⓘ Acknowledged |
| HRM-01 | Lack of token existence check | Volatile Code | ● Informational | ⓘ Acknowledged |
| TOK-01 | Logical issue of <code>mintSudo()</code> and <code>burnSudo()</code> | Control Flow | ● Major | ⓘ Acknowledged |

GLOBAL-01 | Require Permission Control In `mintSudo()` And `burnSudo()`

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|--------------|----------|----------|------------|
| Control Flow | ● Minor | Global | 🟢 Resolved |

Description

The functions `mintSudo()` and `burnSudo()` require permission control. Although the contracts inherit `Proxy` contract and the permission control could be handled there, the proxy is not in the audit scope. The part is treated as a black box so it's not clear that if there is permission control in the two functions.

Recommendation

We recommend the team ensure the logic correctness.

Alleviation

The team heeded our advice and resolved the issue in commit `7cdae8bd2ecb30e5cbecdbbae61f2bd91bb26873`.

GLOBAL-02 | Centralization Risk In Proxy

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|---|----------|----------|----------------|
| Centralization / Privilege, Logical Issue | ● Major | Global | ⓘ Acknowledged |

Description

The contracts of the project are deployed with `proxy`. Apart from the logic in the specific logic contract, the contracts deployed via proxies can add additional permission controls or other logic. Since the proxy contract is not in the audit scope, it will be treated as a black box and assumed functional correctness. However, there will be potential centralization risk in the proxy:

- The admin of the proxy contract has the authority to execute any delegate call.

Any compromise to the `admin` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and users' assets may suffer loss.

Recommendation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the security operation and level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the present stage. We advise the client to carefully manage the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multisignature wallets.

Indicatively, here are some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at a different level in terms of short-term, long-term and permanent:

Short Term:

Timelock and Multi sign ($\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{3}{5}$) combination *mitigate* by delaying the sensitive operation and avoiding a single point of key management failure.

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
AND
- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key compromised;
AND

- A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract and multi-signers addresses information with the public audience.

Long Term:

Timelock and DAO, the combination, *mitigate* by applying decentralization and transparency.

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
AND
- Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement.
AND
- A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract, multi-signers addresses, and DAO information with the public audience.

Permanent:

Renouncing the ownership or removing the function can be considered *fully resolved*.

- Renounce the ownership and never claim back the privileged roles.
OR
- Remove the risky functionality.

Alleviation

The team acknowledged this issue and they will transfer the admin to dead address or Kyberdyne project owner when the project is stable.

CON-01 | Third Party Dependencies

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|---------------|----------|---|----------------|
| Volatile Code | ● Medium | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMLogic.sol | ⓘ Acknowledged |
| | | depends/erc721/HERC721Logic.sol | |
| | | tokens/kgold/KGOLDLogic.sol | |
| | | tokens/kbd/KBDLogic.sol | |
| | | nfts/kcard/KCARDLogic.sol | |

Description

The contracts or modules `Ownable`, `AccessControl`, `Reentrancy`, `Proxy`, `Delegate`, `VRF`, `Deputy`, `NameService` and `HERC20` are not in the audit scope. The scope of the audit treats these contracts as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness.

The functions or modifiers involved are listed: `onlyOnce()`, `onlyOwner()`, `ac.isBlocked()`, `ac.isPrivileged()`, etc.

Recommendation

We understand that the business logic of the project requires interaction with those contracts. We encourage the team to ensure their functional correctness.

Alleviation

The team acknowledged this issue and they will leave it as it is.

CON-02 | Missing Emit Events

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|--------------|----------|---|------------|
| Coding Style | ● Minor | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMLogic.sol depends/erc721/HERC721Logic.sol tokens/kbd/KBDLogic.sol tokens/kgold/KGOLDLogic.sol nfts/kcard/KCARDLogic.sol | ✔ Resolved |

Description

The function that affects the status of sensitive variables should be able to emit events as notifications to the users.

In the contract `HERC20IMLogic`,

- `setAccessControl()`
- `setSupport()`

AND

In the contract `HERC721IMLogic`,

- `setAccessControl()`
- `setSupport()`

AND

In the contract `KBDLogic`,

- `mintSudo()`
- `burnSudo`

AND

In the contract `KGOLDLogic`,

- `mintSudo()`
- `burnSudo`

AND

In the contract `KCARDLogic`,

- `mintSudo()`

- `burnSudo()`
- `setUint256Attribute()`
- `setBytes32Attribute()`
- `setAddressAttribute()`
- `setBytesAttribute()`

Recommendation

Consider adding events for sensitive actions, and emit them in the function.

```
event SetAccessControl(address accessControl);
function setAccessControl(address accessControl_) override external onlyOwner {
    _setAccessControl(accessControl_);
    emit SetAccessControl(accessControl_);
}
```

Alleviation

The team fixed the issue in commit `7cdae8bd2ecb30e5cbebdbbae61f2bd91bb26873` and `ec71cd891a57d5b00608837bd1b46dccfc9797c9`.

CON-03 | Centralization Related Risks

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|----------------------------|----------|---|----------------|
| Centralization / Privilege | ● Major | depends/erc20improved/HERC20IMLogic.sol depends/erc721/HERC721Logic.sol nfts/kcard/KCARDLogic.sol | ⓘ Acknowledged |

Description

In the contract `HERC20IMLogic`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions:

- function `setAccessControl()`, set value for `accessControl`.
- function `setSupport()`, set value for `support`.

AND

In the contract `HERC721IMLogic`, the role `owner` has authority over the following functions:

- function `setAccessControl()`, set value for `accessControl`.
- function `setSupport()`, set value for `support`.

AND

In the contract `KCARDLogic`, the role `owner`, `manager` or `operator` has the authority over the following functions:

- function `mintSudo()`, mint tokens for any arbitrary address.
- function `bind()` and `unbind()`, manage the relationship between offline id and token id.
- function `burnSudo()`, burn token from any arbitrary address.
- function `setUint256Attribute()`, set attributes for the token.
- function `setBytes32Attribute()`, set attributes for the token.
- function `setAddressAttribute()`, set attributes for the token.
- function `setBytesAttribute()`, set attributes for the token.

Any compromise to the privileged accounts may allow a hacker to take advantage of this authority and bring unpredictable damages to the project.

Recommendation

The risk describes the current project design and potentially makes iterations to improve in the security operation and level of decentralization, which in most cases cannot be resolved entirely at the present

stage. We advise the client to carefully manage the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., multi-signature wallets.

Indicatively, here are some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at a different level in terms of short-term, long-term and permanent:

Short Term:

Timelock and Multi sign ($\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{3}{5}$) combination *mitigate* by delaying the sensitive operation and avoiding a single point of key management failure.

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
AND
- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key compromised;
AND
- A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract and multi-signers addresses information with the public audience.

Long Term:

Timelock and DAO, the combination, *mitigate* by applying decentralization and transparency.

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
AND
- Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement;
AND
- A medium/blog link for sharing the timelock contract, multi-signers addresses, and DAO information with the public audience.

Permanent:

Renouncing the ownership or removing the function can be considered *fully resolved*.

- Renounce the ownership and never claim back the privileged roles;
OR
- Remove the risky functionality.

Noted: Recommend considering the long-term solution or the permanent solution. The project team shall make a decision based on the current state of their project, timeline, and project resources.

Alleviation

The team acknowledged this issue and they will transfer the admin roles to dead address or Kyberdyne project owner when the project is stable.

HRM-01 | Lack Of Token Existence Check

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|---------------|-----------------|---|----------------|
| Volatile Code | ● Informational | depends/erc721improved/HERC721IMLogic.sol: 40, 60 | ⓘ Acknowledged |

Description

The functions `_mintSudo()` and `_mintNormal()` lack the check `!_exists(tokenId)`.

Recommendation

We recommend the team add the check in the two functions like that in the function `_burnNormal()` and `_burnSudo()`.

Alleviation

The team stated that the existence check has been done in the contract `HERC721Logic`.

TOK-01 | Logical Issue Of `mintSudo()` And `burnSudo()`

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|--------------|----------|--|----------------|
| Control Flow | ● Major | tokens/kgold/KGOLDLogic.sol tokens/kbd/KBDLogic.sol | ⓘ Acknowledged |

Description

The functions `mintSudo()` and `burnSudo()` can mint tokens for arbitrary address. Especially `burnSudo()` allows the caller to burn money from any user's wallet. Usual tokens don't have the function or require allowance to perform the burn operation. There are high risks in the user's property security.

Recommendation

We recommend the team check the logic and fix the issue.

Alleviation

The team acknowledged this issue and they stated the following:

"The KBD is minted up to the cap so the `mintSudo` and `burnSudo` function is useless. The admin of KBD will transfer to dead address once online. The KGOLD will be minted on demand due to offline game server. The admin of KGOLD will be set to offline server's address."

Appendix

Finding Categories

Centralization / Privilege

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how `block.timestamp` works.

Control Flow

Control Flow findings concern the access control imposed on functions, such as owner-only functions being invoke-able by anyone under certain circumstances.

Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux `"sha256sum"` command against the target file.

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About

Founded in 2017 by leading academics in the field of Computer Science from both Yale and Columbia University, CertiK is a leading blockchain security company that serves to verify the security and correctness of smart contracts and blockchain-based protocols. Through the utilization of our world-class technical expertise, alongside our proprietary, innovative tech, we're able to support the success of our clients with best-in-class security, all whilst realizing our overarching vision; provable trust for all throughout all facets of blockchain.

